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We provide a new interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria that incor-
porates both von Neumann and Morgenstern’s classical concealment role of
mixing as well as the more recent Bayesian view originating with Harsanyi.
For any two-person game, G, we consider an incomplete information game,
IG, in which each player’s type is the probability he assigns to the event
that his mixed strategy in G is “found out” by his opponent. We show
that, generically, any regular equilibrium of G can be approximated by an
equilibrium of IG in which almost every type of each player is strictly opti-
mizing. This leads us to interpret i’s equilibrium mixed strategy in G as a
combination of deliberate randomization by i together with uncertainty on
j’s part about which randomization i will employ. We also show that such
randomization is not unusual: For example, i’s randomization is nondegen-
erate whenever the support of an equilibrium contains cyclic best replies.
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The purpose of this paper is to better understand mixed strategy Nash equilibria
in ﬁnite two-person games. In particular, we show that a player’s equilibrium
mixture can be usefully understood partly in terms of deliberate randomization
by the player, and partly as an expression of the opponent’s uncertainty about
which randomization the player will employ. This allows us to unify the other-
wise sharply distinct views of mixed strategies proposed by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) for zero-sum games and by Harsanyi (1973) for nonzero-sum
games.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM (1944)), when focusing on two-person
zero-sum games, unequivocally interpret mixing as an act of deliberate random-
ization whose purpose is to conceal. They point out that each player strictly
prefers any one of his equilibrium strategies over any other strategy if he is cer-
tain that the mixed strategy he chooses will be found out by his opponent prior
to his opponent’s choice.
For example, in Matching Pennies player 1 strictly prefers the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture
over every other mixed strategy when he knows that player 2 will ﬁnd out the
mixed strategy he chooses. VNM conclude from this that there is a defensive or
concealment rationale for mixing in zero-sum games:
T h u so n ei m p o r t a n tc o n s i d e r a t i o nf o rap l a y e ri ns u c hag a m ei st op r o t e c th i m -
self against having his intentions found out by his opponent. Playing several such
strategies at random, so that only their probabilities are determined is a very ef-
fective way to achieve a degree of such protection: By this device the opponent
cannot possibly ﬁnd out what the player’s strategy is going to be, since the player
does not know it himself (vNM (1944, p. 146)).
According to the classical rationale, then, a mixed strategy represents delib-
erate randomization on a player’s part. Everyone, including the player himself,
is uncertain about that player’s pure choice. However, because it is based on the
desirability of concealment, the classical rationale for mixing runs into diﬃculties
in nonzero-sum games. As Schelling notes:
The essence of randomization in a two-person zero-sum game is to preclude the
adversary from gaining intelligence about one’s mode of play... In games that
mix conﬂict with common interest, however, randomization plays no such central
role... (Schelling (1960, p. 175)).
2Consider, for example, the mixed equilibrium in the Battle of the Sexes. In
this equilibrium, neither player can be thought of as deliberately randomizing to
conceal his pure choice because, in this game, each player prefers to reveal his
pure choice, whatever it is, to the other player. Thus, the classical rationale is
inappropriate here.
But if concealment is not the rationale for mixing in general games, what
is? Harsanyi (1973) provides an ingenious answer. He shows that virtually any
m i x e de q u i l i b r i u mc a nb ev i e w e da sa ne q u i l i b r i u mo fan e a r b yg a m eo fi n c o m p l e t e
information in which small private variations in the players’ payoﬀsl e a dt h e mt o
strictly prefer one of their pure strategies. Thus, from Harsanyi’s point of view no
player ever actually randomizes and a player i is uncertain about another player
j’s pure choice only because it varies with j’s type, which is private information.
The signiﬁcant conceptual idea introduced by Harsanyi is that a player’s mixed
strategy expresses the ignorance of the other players–not of the player himself –
about that player’s pure strategy choice.1
Aumann (1987; see especially Section 6) takes Harsanyi’s idea further. By
eliminating the payoﬀ perturbations altogether, he directly interprets a player’s
mixed strategy solely as an expression of the other players’ uncertainty about that
player’s pure strategy choice. This view is now widespread.2 Indeed, as Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995) remark:
In recent years, a diﬀerent view of mixing has emerged. According to this view,
players do not randomize; each player chooses some deﬁnite action. But other
players need not know which one, and the mixture represents their uncertainty,
their conjecture about his choice.
Thus, the view of mixing that has emerged, the Bayesian view let us call it,
bears no resemblance to the classical view that mixing represents a deliberate
decision to randomize in order to conceal one’s choice. The concealment role of
mixing has been entirely left behind.
In contrast, we argue here that the intuitively appealing classical view can
be incorporated into a general interpretation of mixed equilibria. In fact, the
approach we propose is tied to both the Bayesian and classical views.
1We thank Bob Aumann for suggesting to us that this conceptual contribution by Haranyi
was at least as important as his formal puriﬁcation theorem.
2For example, see Armbruster and Boege (1979), Tan and Werlang (1988) and Brandenburger
and Dekel (1989).
3Our approach is tied to the Bayesian view by incorporating Harsanyi’s idea that
a player’s private information can lead to uncertainty about that player’s choice
from the opponent’s perspective. However, our approach diﬀers crucially from
Harsanyi’s in terms of the precise nature of the players’ private information. In
our setup, there is no uncertainty about payoﬀs. Rather, each player is concerned
that his opponent might ﬁnd out his choice of mixed strategy, and it is the level of
this concern that is private information. As in Harsanyi, such private information
can make the opponent more uncertain about a player’s choice than is the player
himself. But, in our approach, because each player is concerned that his mixed
strategy might be found out by his opponent, he may beneﬁt from the concealment
eﬀect of deliberate randomization. This simultaneously ties our approach to the
classical view.
More precisely, we interpret equilibria of any ﬁnite two-person game G as lim-
its of equilibria of certain suﬃciently nearby games of incomplete information,
IG. Each incomplete information game, IG, is derived from G as follows. Nature
moves ﬁrst by independently choosing, for each player i, at y p e ,ti ∈ [0,1], accord-
ing to some continuous distribution. Each player is privately informed of his own
type, which is his assessment of the probability that the opponent will ﬁnd out
his mixed strategy before the opponent moves. We shall be concerned with the
equilibria of IG as the type distributions become concentrated around zero and
so as the players’ concerns for being found out vanish.
As in Harsanyi, our model provides the players with strict incentives. Indeed,
as we show, any regular equilibrium of G c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e db ya ne q u i l i b r i u mo f
IG in which almost every type of each player is strictly optimizing. But there is an
important diﬀerence. Harsanyi’s players strictly prefer to use only pure strategies,
while our players in general strictly prefer to use mixed strategies. When our
players mix, they do so deliberately, because the beneﬁts of concealment make
this strictly optimal, not because the equilibrium requires them to make the other
player indiﬀerent. Conversely, when our players choose pure strategies, they do
so because randomization is harmful and they actively wish to reveal their choice
to the other player.
For example, in the unique equilibrium of our incomplete information pertur-
bation, IG, of Matching Pennies, all types of both players strictly optimize by
choosing the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture (see Section 2). Thus, neither player’s behavior
depends upon his private information and each player deliberately randomizes.
Such randomization is strictly beneﬁcial because each player believes the other
might ﬁnd out his mixed strategy. Our approach therefore supports the classical
4view of the mixed equilibrium in Matching Pennies, namely, that each player de-
liberately randomizes ﬁfty-ﬁfty and is certain that his opponent will do so as well.
Indeed, Theorem 4.1 generalizes this to all zero-sum games.
On the other hand, all equilibria of IG near the completely mixed equilibrium
of Battle of the Sexes require almost every type of each player to employ one of
his two pure strategies (see Section 2). Concealment is shown to play no role in
this equilibrium precisely because each player prefers to reveal his pure choice in
this game. Moreover, our rationale for the mixed equilibrium here coincides with
the Bayesian view: Each player i employs one or the other pure strategy; player
j does not know which pure strategy i will employ, but assigns some probability
to each one, where these probabilities are given by i’s equilibrium mixture. This
is generalized in Theorem 6.4 which states that if, starting from any cell in G’s
payoﬀ matrix, both players’ payoﬀs increase whenever either one of them switches
to a best reply, then every equilibrium of our incomplete information perturbation
requires almost every type of each player to employ a pure strategy.
So, our interpretation coincides with the classical view in zero-sum games, and
it coincides with the Bayesian view in a class of coordination games. But what
about the vast majority of games lying between these two extremes? As shown
by example in Section 2, our interpretation will typically diﬀer from both the
Bayesian and classical views. The example is a 3x3 nonzero-sum game with a
unique completely mixed equilibrium, m∗. In our incomplete information pertur-
bation, no type of either player chooses his completely mixed equilibrium strategy,
yet no type of either player chooses a pure strategy either. Instead, almost every
type of each player i strictly optimizes by using one of three mixed strategies,
mi1,m i2, or mi3, each of which gives positive weight to just two pure strategies.
Each randomization, mik, beneﬁts i by optimally concealing the two pure strate-
gies in its support. Further, if µik denotes the fraction of player i’s types using
mik in the limit as the players’ concerns for being found out converge to zero, then
m∗
i = µi1mi1 + µi2mi2 + µi3mi3.
T h ea b o v et h r e eg a m e ss e r v et oe x e m p l i f yt h ef o l l o w i n gg e n e r a li n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of any equilibrium, m∗, of the original game G :
Each player i’s equilibrium mixture, m∗
i, can be expressed as a convex combi-
nation of a ﬁxed ﬁnite set of i’s mixed strategies, mik, say. Each mixed strategy
in the convex combination represents a strategy that i might deliberately employ,
while the weight on that mixed strategy represents the opponent’s belief that i will
employ it.
5Such convex combinations reveal the role of deliberate randomization. In our
perturbed game, where players are slightly concerned that their mixed strategy
might be found out, the strategies mik are strictly optimal for the types employing
them and, when the mik are non-degenerate, they optimally conceal the pure
strategies in their support.
One might wonder when at least one of the mik above is nondegenerate, be-
cause then our interpretation involves deliberate randomization. Theorem 6.2
states that if the support of an equilibrium, m∗, of any game G contains a best-
reply cycle, then a positive (and bounded away from zero) measure of both players’
types must use non-degenerate mixed strategies, mik, in any approximating equi-
librium of IG. Hence, the presence of best reply cycles in the support of an
equilibrium of a two-person game indicates a role for deliberate randomization in
that equilibrium.
From the perspective oﬀered here, the classical and Bayesian views are ex-
treme. On the one hand, our interpretation coincides with the classical view only
when the above convex combination is degenerate, placing full weight on i’s equi-
librium mixed strategy, as in matching pennies. On the other, our interpretation
coincides with the Bayesian view only when every mixed strategy in the above
convex combination is pure, with weights given by i’s equilibrium mixture, as
in the Battle of the Sexes. In general, our interpretation diﬀers from both the
classical and Bayesian views, as typiﬁed by the third example above.
A strength of our interpretation is that it eliminates the sharp distinction be-
tween zero-sum and nonzero-sum games insofar as the role of randomization is
concerned. For example, according to our view, when moving from matching pen-
nies to the battle of the sexes through continuous payoﬀ changes, the role played
by deliberate randomization in their mixed equilibria continuously diminishes to
zero.
We restrict attention to two-person games. Additional issues arise with three
or more players. For example, one must then specify how many opponents ﬁnd
out a player’s mixed strategy. There does not appear to be a single natural choice
here. However, there is no reason to doubt that any reasonable choice will yield
strict incentives to mix in some games, as we obtain here.
In addition to the work cited above, a rich literature on puriﬁcation has grown
out of Harsanyi’s (1973) seminal contribution. (See, for example, Radner and
Rosenthal (1982) and Aumann et al. (1983).) The central issue in this literature
is whether every mixed strategy equilibrium of an incomplete information game
is (perhaps approximately) equivalent to some pure strategy equilibrium. In our
6model, this is not an issue because, as we shall show, all equilibria of IG are pure,
generically. B u tn o t et h a tap u r es t r a t e g yi nIG allows the players’ to choose
non-degenerate mixed strategies from G.
More closely related are Rosenthal (1991) and Robson (1994).3 Both papers
are concerned with the robustness of equilibria of two-person games to changes
in the information structure. Rosenthal observes that equilibria of some nonzero-
sum games remain equilibria even when the opponent is sure to ﬁnd out one’s
mixed strategy choice.
Robson perturbs arbitrary two-person games by supposing that each player’s
pure or mixed strategy is found out by the opponent with a common known
probability. Equilibria that survive arbitrarily small perturbations of this kind
are called “informationally robust.” Robson shows that informationally robust
equilibria exist and reﬁne Nash equilibria.4 He also observes that informational
robustness with respect to mixed strategies yields strict incentives to mix in some
2x2 nonzero-sum examples. However, in a typical informationally robust equilib-
rium, the players will not have strict incentives and they randomize in order to
make the opponent indiﬀerent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains three
leading examples illustrating the main ideas. Section 3 describes our incomplete
information perturbation of an arbitrary two-person game. Section 4 provides our
results concerning zero-sum games, while Section 5 analyzes the more challeng-
ing nonzero-sum case and contains our main approximation theorem. Section 6
provides conditions under which our interpretation necessarily involves the classi-
cal view that players deliberately randomize, as well as a condition under which
our interpretation involves only the Bayesian view in which no player randomizes.
Section 7 provides an example showing the potential signiﬁcance of unused strate-
gies. Finally, Section 8 brieﬂy discusses how our static model, in which a player’s
mixed strategy is revealed with some probability, is the reduced form of a dynamic
game in which only a player’s past history of pure a c t i o n si se v e rr e v e a l e d .
3Less closely related is Matsui (1989). He considers a repeated game with a small probability
that one player’s entire supergame strategy will be revealed to the other player. In contrast,
in a repeated game interpretation of our model (see Section 8), an opponent observes, at most,
one’s history of past actions, not one’s entire supergame strategy.
4Our results here imply that, generically, the sets of informationally robust equilibria and
Nash equilibria coincide.
72. Three Leading Examples
The scope of the present approach can be demonstrated by considering three
examples: Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, and Modiﬁed Rock-Scissors-
Paper. To each of these normal form games, G,s a y ,w ea s s o c i a t ean e a r b yg a m e
of incomplete information, IG, which we now describe informally.
For 0 ≤ ε < ¯ ε ≤ 1, the players’ types, t1 for player 1 and t2 for player 2,
are drawn independently and uniformly from [ε,¯ ε]. The players choose a mixed
strategy in G as a function of their type. With probability 1−ti player i receives
the payoﬀ in G from the pair of mixed strategies chosen, whereas with probability
ti he receives the payoﬀ in G resulting from his mixed strategy choice together
with a best reply for j against it.5 More precisely, letting ui denote i’s payoﬀ in
G, if i chooses the mixed strategy mi from G and j chooses mj, then i’s payoﬀ in
IG when his type is ti is
(1 − ti)ui(m1,m 2)+tivi(mi),
where vi(mi)=m a x xj∈Bj(mi) ui(mi,x j) and Bj(mi) is the set of best replies for j
against mi.
Accordingly, we interpret a player’s type to be the probability he assigns to
the event that the opponent ﬁn d so u th i sm i x e ds t r a t e g ya n db e s tr e p l i e st o
it. However, note that neither player believes he will ﬁnd out the opponent’s
mixed strategy.6 Hence each type of each player makes only the single decision
of choosing a mixed strategy in G. Note also that player i cares only about the
overall distribution over pure strategies in G induced by the opponent’s strategy
in IG. This is because, from i’s point of view, the opponent’s strategy in IG is
relevant for determining i’s payoﬀ o n l yw h e nt h eo p p o n e n td o e sn o tﬁnd out i’s
mixed strategy.
We are interested in the limiting equilibria of IG as ¯ ε and ε tend to zero, so
that IG tends to the original game G.
5If there are multiple best replies for j against i’s mixed strategy, then one that is best for i
is employed. See Section 3.
6It would be equivalent to consider an extensive form game in which it is common knowledge
that each player might ﬁnd out the other’s mixed strategy (see Appendix A). A player’s single
decision in IG corresponds to his only nontrivial decision in the extensive form, arising when he
does not ﬁnd out the opponent’s mixed strategy.
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Figure 2.1: Matching Pennies
2.1. Matching Pennies
Recall vNM’s observation that in Matching Pennies (Figure 2.1) the players strictly
prefer the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture when they are sure to be found out. We shall show
that for every ¯ ε>ε> 0, including those near zero, IG has an equilibrium in
which every type of each player chooses to randomize ﬁfty-ﬁfty over H and T and
that this non-degenerate mixture is strictly optimal.
So, suppose that every type of player 2 uses the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture. Consider
player 1’s payoﬀ as a function of the probability, p, that his mixed strategy assigns
to H, given that player 2 ﬁnds out this mixed strategy. Player 1’s payoﬀ is negative
both for p ∈ [0,1/2), w h e r e2 ’ sb e s tr e p l yi sH ,a n df o rp ∈ (1/2,1] where 2’s best
reply is T, and so is uniquely maximized at p =1 /2, where it is zero, regardless
of 2’s reply.
N o wc o n s i d e rp l a y e r1i nIG when his type, the probability he assigns to being
found out, is t1 ∈ [ε,¯ ε]. Because the other player is mixing equally, any type
of player 1 is indiﬀerent among all his mixed strategies conditional on not being
found out. Hence, because player 1 of type t1 > 0 assigns positive probability
to the event that he is found out, the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture is the uniquely optimal
choice for every type of player 1, as claimed. A similar argument holds when the
players’ roles are reversed. Thus, the incomplete information game associated with
Matching Pennies captures the classical point of view that mixing is a deliberate
attempt to conceal one’s choice.
2.2. Battle of the Sexes
Consider next the Battle of the Sexes (henceforth BoS; see Figure 2.2) and the






Figure 2.2: Battle of the Sexes
probability 2/3. (A player’s “favorite” pure strategy yields him a payoﬀ of 2 if
coordination is achieved.)
For this example, set ε =0 , so that in IG the player types are drawn indepen-
dently and uniformly from [0,¯ ε]. We will show ﬁrst that, regardless of the value
of ¯ ε>0, almost every type of each player has a unique optimal pure strategy
in every equilibrium of IG and second that, for ¯ ε>0 small enough, there exists
an equilibrium of IG in which approximately 2/3 of each player’s types choose
that player’s favorite BoS pure strategy and the remainder choose the other pure
strategy.7 Taken together, this leads to a purely Bayesian interpretation of the
strictly mixed equilibrium in BoS.
So, let us begin by consulting Figure 2.3. The solid lines in the ﬁgure show
player 1’s payoﬀ as a function of the probability p he places on T, given that player
2 ﬁnds out player 1’s mixed strategy. When p ∈ [0,2/3), player 2’s best reply is
Ra n d1 ’ sp a y o ﬀ is decreasing in p. When p ∈ (2/3,1], player 2’s best reply is L
and 1’s payoﬀ is increasing in p. When p =2 /3, player 2 is indiﬀerent between L
and R, but player 1 strictly prefers that player 2 choose L, which accounts for the
discontinuity.
Now, a mixed strategy in IG speciﬁes, for each of a player’s types, a probability
distribution, or “lottery,” over the player’s mixed strategies in G. Such a lottery
therefore determines which mixed strategy, mi from the game G, the player’s type
will employ in IG. Consequently, if player i of type ti uses such a lottery, then he
assigns probability ti to the event that his opponent ﬁnds out the mixed strategy
mi that is the outcome of this lottery. To avoid confusion, we will refer to mixed
strategies in IG as “lotteries,” reserving the term “mixed strategies” for strategies
7Because Battle of the Sexes has multiple equilibria, so does its associated incomplete infor-
mation game IG.









Figure 2.3: Player 1 Found Out in Battle of the Sexes
mi in G.
Consider now the dotted line in Figure 2.3 connecting player 1’s payoﬀsw h e n
he chooses the two pure strategies B (p =0 )and T (p =1 ) . We claim that,
conditional on being found out, any payoﬀ along the dotted line can be achieved
by employing an appropriate lottery over the degenerate mixed strategies B and T.
In particular, if player 1 of type t1 uses the lottery that chooses T with probability
π and B with probability 1−π, then player 1’s payoﬀ is 2π+1(1−π), conditional
on being found out. That is, because player 2 ﬁnds out the outcome of the lottery,
2’s best reply always yields coordination, giving player 1 an average of his payoﬀs
along the diagonal.
The dotted line lies above player 1’s payoﬀ in Figure 2.3 and so player 1 prefers
such a lottery π ∈ (0,1) to the mixed strategy giving T the same probability
p = π, conditional on being found out. In contrast to the lottery, the mixed
strategy, when combined with the opponent’s best reply, leads to miscoordination
with positive probability.
On the other hand, conditional on not being found out, the lottery π yields
the same payoﬀ as does the mixed strategy p = π. Altogether then, every positive
11type of player 1 must strictly prefer the lottery π = p to the mixed strategy p, for
any p ∈ (0,1).
Thus, regardless of player 2’s strategy, every positive type of player 1 strictly
prefers at least one of the two pure strategies T or B to any mixed strategy
p ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, because T and B yield distinct payoﬀs conditional on
being found out, the linearity of 1’s payoﬀi nh i st y pei m p l i e st h a ta tm o s to n eo fh i s
types can be indiﬀerent between T and B. We conclude that in every equilibrium of
IG, all but perhaps one of player 1’s positive types strictly optimizes by employing
a pure strategy. Since a similar argument applies to player 2, we have shown
that almost every player type employs a unique optimal pure strategy in every
equilibrium of IG.
We now show that if ¯ ε>0 is small enough, IG has an equilibrium whose
distribution over the pure strategies in G is arbitrarily close to the strictly mixed
equilibrium of BoS. Given what we have already shown, we may restrict attention
to strategies in IG in which player 1 chooses either T or B, and player 2 chooses
either L or R. The equilibrium of IG we seek is such that roughly 2/3 of player
1’s types choose T and roughly 2/3 of player 2’s types choose R. This equilibrium
is determined by a critical type for each player i, namely ˆ ti = α¯ ε for α near 1/3,
where type t1 of player 1 chooses
Bi ft1 < ˆ t1;a n dTi ft1 ≥ ˆ t1 (2.1)
and type t2 of player 2 chooses
Li ft2 < ˆ t2; and R if t2 ≥ ˆ t2. (2.2)
Note that larger types, who assign a higher probability to being found out, choose
their favorite pure BoS strategy.
For this to be an equilibrium, α must be such that the critical type ˆ ti is indiﬀer-
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which for ¯ ε small is close to 1/3. By symmetry, this value of α also makes player
2’s critical type ˆ t2 = α¯ ε indiﬀerent between L and R.8
8From (2.1) and (2.2), the payoﬀ to player 1’s critical type ˆ t1 = α¯ ε from choosing T is
α2+(1−α)0, if he is not found out, since a fraction α of player 2’s types choose L, and 2, if he is
found out. Hence, player ˆ t1’s payoﬀ from T is πˆ t1(T)=( 1−ˆ t1)(α2+(1−α)0)+2ˆ t1 =2 ( −¯ εα2+
12Now, all types of player 1 below the critical type strictly prefer B to T, whereas
all types above strictly prefer T to B. Indeed, for a typical type t1 of player 1, the
diﬀerence in payoﬀ from choosing T versus B is
πt1(T) − πt1(B)=( 1− t1)(3α − 1) + t1,
which, for α close enough to 1/3 (for ¯ ε close enough to zero) is strictly increasing
in t1, and vanishes at ˆ t1. A similar preference holds between L and R for player 2.
Therefore, the strategies (2.1) and (2.2) form an equilibrium of IG. Con-
sequently, our interpretation of the mixed equilibrium of Battle of the Sexes is
Bayesian: Each player chooses some particular pure strategy, yet the opponent
is unsure of which one. The probabilities associated with a player’s equilibrium
mixture represent the opponent’s beliefs about which pure strategy the player will
choose.
Thus our incomplete information perturbation is, like Harsanyi (1973), able
to rationalize the mixed equilibria of Matching Pennies and Battle of the Sexes
as strict equilibria. But the interpretations of the two models are quite distinct.
The player types in our perturbation optimally choose whether to reveal or to
conceal their choices, choosing to conceal them in Matching Pennies (producing
a classical interpretation) and to reveal them in Battle of the Sexes (producing a
Bayesian interpretation); whereas in Harsanyi, almost all player types always use
only pure strategies.
Our ﬁnal example leads to a new interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria.
2.3. Modiﬁed Rock-Scissors-Paper
Consider the nonzero-sum modiﬁcation of the zero-sum game Rock-Scissors-Paper
s h o w ni nF i g u r e2 . 4 , where a<b<c<1 and a is close to 1. Modiﬁed Rock-
Scissors-Paper (MRSP) diﬀers from the usual version in two respects. First the
game is no longer zero-sum because each player receives a payoﬀ near -1 along the
diagonal. Second, the oﬀ-diagonal payoﬀs have been perturbed slightly.
The new diagonal payoﬀs add an element of common interest in that both
players now wish to avoid the diagonal. The perturbation of the oﬀ-diagonal
payoﬀs avoids a particular non genericity, clariﬁed below.9
(1 +¯ ε)α). Similarly, ˆ t1’s payoﬀ from B is πˆ t1(B)=( 1− ˆ t1)(α0+( 1− α)1) + 1ˆ t1 =¯ εα2 − α +1 .
Equating the two gives the value of α.
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Figure 2.4: Modiﬁed Rock-Scissors-Paper
If a = b = c =1 , then MRSP has a unique equilibrium in which both players
choose each of their pure strategies with probability 1/3. Moreover, because
a<b<c<1 and a is near 1, there is a unique equilibrium in which each pure
strategy is chosen with probability near 1/3 and in which each player’s equilibrium
payoﬀ is near −1/3.
Figure 2.5 shows player 1’s payoﬀ in the incomplete information game IG as a
function of his mixed strategy, conditional on being found out. Triangle TMB in
the ﬁgure is player 1’s simplex of mixed strategy choices. Its vertices are labelled
with the pure strategies, T, M and B, they represent. The hyperplanes above
the triangle depict player 1’s payoﬀ, conditional on player 2 ﬁnding out his mixed
strategy and choosing a best reply. Each hyperplane is labelled with the 2’s best
reply. Because a is almost equal to one, the three hyperplanes almost meet at
player 1’s equilibrium strategy in the center of the ﬁgure, yielding player 1 a
payoﬀ there close to −1/3, regardless of 2’s best reply.
If player 1 were sure that his strategy would be found out, he would not choose
a pure strategy, which would result in a payoﬀ close to −1; neither would he choose
the equilibrium mixture, which yields a payoﬀ near −1/3. Instead, player 1 would
choose the mixed strategy placing probability 1/2 on T and 1/2 on B. It is then
a best reply for player 2 to choose C resulting in a positive payoﬀ of (1−a)/2 for
player 1.10 Evidently, the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture reveals enough so that player 2 can
avoid the diagonal, which is in their common interest, but it still conceals 1’s ﬁnal











Figure 2.5: Player 1 Found Out in Modiﬁed Rock-Scissors-Paper
pure choice, reﬂecting the conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s to ﬀ the diagonal.
Indeed, the three mixed strategies 1/2-1/2 on T-B; 1/2-1/2 on T-M; 1/2-1/2
on M-B all yield player 1 a positive payoﬀ conditional on being found out. Figure
2.5 shows that these strategies yield attractive payoﬀs relative to all other mixed
strategies, when player 2 chooses a best reply.
If ¯ ε is small enough and ε is close enough to ¯ ε, then these particular three
mixed strategies yield an equilibrium of IG, as follows. For each player i there
are two critical types, ˆ ti1 < ˆ ti2. Player 1 chooses
1/2-1/2 on M-B if t1 ∈ [ε,ˆ t11)
1/2-1/2 on T-M if t1 ∈ [ˆ t11,ˆ t12)
1/2-1/2 on T-B if t1 ∈ [ˆ t12,¯ ε]
and player 2 chooses
1/2-1/2 on C-R if t2 ∈ [ε,ˆ t21)
1/2-1/2 on L-C if t2 ∈ [ˆ t21,ˆ t22)
1/2-1/2 on L-R if t2 ∈ [ˆ t22,¯ ε].
15Moreover, each of these intervals of types occurs with probability approximately
1/3. Each player’s strategy therefore induces a probability near 1/3 for each of
the original pure strategies, and so approximates the mixed equilibrium of MRSP.
Thus, we are led to the following interpretation of the completely mixed equi-
librium of MRSP: Each player i deliberately randomizes by choosing one of the
mixed strategies that place probability one-half on each of two pure strategies.
The opponent, player j, u n a w a r eo fw h i c ho n eo ft h et h r e ep o s s i b l eﬁfty-ﬁfty ran-
domizations player i will employ, assigns probability roughly one-third to each
possibility. Player i’s equilibrium mixture is obtained by combining the three ran-
domized strategies i might employ according to the weights j’s beliefs assign to
those strategies.
Let us emphasize the strategic beneﬁts of the above strategies. By choosing a
ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture, enough information is revealed so that, if this mixture is found
out, the opponent can successfully avoid the diagonal but cannot take undue
advantage. Hence, our analysis uncovers the manner in which players strike a
balance between revealing information and concealing it in nonzero-sum games.
Finally, because a, b, and c are distinct, it can be shown that these equilibrium
mixed strategies are strictly optimal. That is, all types of each player except the
two critical types strictly prefer their ﬁfty-ﬁfty equilibrium mixture to any other
strategy.11
We now proceed with the formal analysis of the general case and also explore
conditions under which concealment is helpful–as in Matching Pennies and Mod-
iﬁed Rock-Scissors-Paper–and conditions under which it is not–as in Battle of
the Sexes.
3. The Incomplete Information Perturbation
Let G =( ui,X i)i=1,2 be a ﬁnite two-person normal form game in which player i’s
ﬁnite pure strategy set is Xi, his mixed strategy set is Mi, and his vNM payoﬀ
function is ui : X1 × X2 → R. We wish to capture the idea that each player
is concerned that the other player might ﬁnd out his mixed strategy, where the
extent to which each player is concerned is private information. Ultimately, we
shall be interested in the players’ limiting behavior as these concerns vanish.
Given the game G, consider the following associated game of incomplete in-
11This is why we perturbed the oﬀ-diagonal payoﬀs.
16formation.
IG =( U1,U 2,M 1,M 2,F 1,F 2):
• Each Fi is a cdf with Fi(0) = 0 and support Ti ⊆ [0,1].
• Player i’s type set is Ti.
• Types are drawn independently according to F1 and F2.
• Player i’s pure action set is Mi, his set of mixed strategies in G.
• When i’s type is ti and the vector of actions is (m1,m 2), player i’s payoﬀ is
Ui(m1,m 2,t i)=( 1− ti)ui(m1,m 2)+tivi(mi),
where vi(mi) is i’s payoﬀ in G resulting from mi together with a best reply
against it. If there are multiple best replies for j against mi,o n et h a ti sb e s t
for i is employed.12
Thus, Ui(m1,m 2,t i) is the payoﬀ i would receive in G when he plays mi and
his opponent plays mj with probability 1 − ti and plays a best reply to mi with
probability ti.P l a y e ri’s type ti can therefore be interpreted as the probability he
assigns to the event that his choice of mixed strategy in G will be found out by
the opponent.
The above deﬁnition actually yields a collection of incomplete information
games indexed by the distribution functions F1 and F2. We shall often be con-
cerned with atomless cdf’s. Such cdf’s, Fi, in addition to satisfying Fi(0) = 0, are
continuous on [0,1]. Note that the incomplete information game approaches the
original game G as the measure on each player’s types tends to a mass point at
zero.
3.1. Strategies, Lotteries and Induced Distributions
As t r a t e g yf o rp l a y e ri in IG is a measurable map from Ti into ∆(Mi), where
∆(Mi) denotes the set of Borel probability measures on Mi. We shall refer to
elements of Mi as mixed strategies in G, and to elements of ∆(Mi) as lotteries
12That is, vi(mi)=m a x xj ui(mi,x j), s.t. xj ∈ argmaxx0
j∈Xj uj(mi,x 0
j). So deﬁned, vi(·) is
upper semicontinuous. The tie-breaking rule is innocuous because generically, some m0
i near mi
leaves j with a unique best reply and gives i ap a y o ﬀ near vi(mi).
17on Mi. So, in the incomplete information game IG, a strategy speciﬁes for each
type of each player a lottery over that player’s mixed strategies in G. Each player
believes that, with the probability given by his type, his opponent ﬁnds out the
mixed strategy in G that is the outcome of his type’s lottery. Pure strategies in
the incomplete information game are then degenerate lotteries and so specify a
mixed strategy in G for each of a player’s types.
An equilibrium of IG is a pair of strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium
from the ex-ante perspective. Equivalently, an equilibrium strategy pair must be
such that given the other player’s strategy, the element of ∆(Mi) chosen by ti
must be optimal for i conditional on ti, for Fi-almost every ti.
Let σi(·|·) be a strategy for player i in IG. Hence, σi(·|ti) is for each ti in Ti a
lottery on Mi. Because each mi in Mi induces a distribution over i’s set of pure






Let us denote this induced probability by ¯ σi(xi), a n dt h ei n d u c e dm i x e ds t r a t e g y
in Mi by ¯ σi.
Because player i’s payoﬀ in IG does not directly depend upon j’s type, and
because j’s strategy σj matters to i only when i’s strategy is not found out, i’s
payoﬀ depends only on the induced distribution ¯ σj over Xj and not otherwise on
σj.
This can be seen by considering player i’s payoﬀ w h e nh i st y p ei sti and he







which, owing to the linearity of ui in mj is equal to
(1 − ti)ui(mi, ¯ σj)+tivi(mi).
4. Zero-Sum Games
In our informal analysis of Matching Pennies in Section 2, we claimed that the
equilibrium of IG in which every type of each player chooses the ﬁfty-ﬁfty mixture
is the essentially unique equilibrium. This is a consequence of a more general result
for zero-sum games that is given below.
18Recall that a maxmin strategy in a zero-sum game is one that yields a player
his value if the opponent employs a best reply. We then have the following result,
whose proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that G is a zero-sum game. Then a joint strategy in IG
is an equilibrium if and only if almost every type of each player employs, with
probability one, a maxmin strategy for G. Furthermore, in every equilibrium of
IG, every type of each player is indiﬀerent among all of his maxmin strategies,
and every positive type strictly prefers each of his maxmin strategies to each non
maxmin strategy.
Note that when a player has more than one maxmin strategy, no equilibrium
of IG is strict since all maxmin strategies are then best replies. But the in-
determinacy caused by this indiﬀerence is inconsequential because any mixture
of maxmin strategies is itself a maxmin strategy. Consequently, neither player
is forced to employ any particular randomization over his maxmin strategies in
order to maintain equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1 leads to a purely classical interpretation of equilibria of two-
person zero-sum games, because each player deliberately employs a maxmin strat-
egy (which often involves randomization) and each is certain that the other will
do so. We now explore the interpretation our model yields for equilibria of general
two-person games.
5. General Two-Person Games
Our objective, as above, is to interpret any equilibrium of G through a nearby
equilibrium of IG. To do so requires the game G to be suﬃciently robust. The
f o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n sm a k et h i sp r e c i s e .
5.1. Genericity
Recall from Section 3 that G =( ui,X i)i=1,2 is a ﬁnite two-person game with mixed
strategy sets Mi, and that vi(mi) is i’s payoﬀ in G when he chooses mi and his
opponent plays a best reply to mi (breaking ties in i’s favor if necessary).
For each xj ∈ Xj, let Ci(xj) denote those elements of Mi against which xj
is a best reply for j. Consequently, each Ci(xj) is a convex polyhedron and so
possesses ﬁnitely many extreme points. Let {mi1,...,miKi} denote the union over
xj of the extreme points contained in all the Ci(xj).
19We shall require the following genericity assumptions:
A.1. Every equilibrium of G is regular.13
A.2. For each player i, vi(mi1),...,vi(miKi) are distinct.
Both A.1 and A.2 are satisﬁed for all but perhaps a closed subset of games, G,
having Lebesgue measure zero (in payoﬀ space for any ﬁxed ﬁnite number of pure
strategies). The proof of this is standard in the case of A.1 (van Damme (1991,
Chapter 2.6, Theorem 2.6.1, p. 42)) and can be found in Appendix B for A.2.
An equilibrium of IG =( U1,U 2,M 1,M 2,F 1,F 2) is essentially strict if Fi-almost
every type of each player i has a unique best choice in Mi. The role of genericity
assumption A.2 is to ensure essential strictness, as the following result shows.
Proposition 5.1. If G satisﬁes genericity assumption A.2 and each Fi is atom-
less, then every equilibrium of IG is essentially strict and almost every type of
each player i employs some mixed strategy in {mi1,...,miKi}.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Consequently, for generic games, the
problem of indiﬀerence does not arise in our incomplete information game. This
is important because our player types in general employ non-degenerate mixed
strategies. Essential strictness ensures that when non-degenerate mixed strategies
are employed, this is not to make the other player indiﬀerent. Rather, they are
employed because it is strictly optimal to do so (because concealment happens to
be beneﬁcial). We now provide the main result of this section which establishes
that our incomplete information game can approximate all equilibria of a generic
game G.
5.2. The Main Approximation Theorem
Theorem 5.2. If G satisﬁes genericity assumptions A.1 and A.2, then for every
ε>0 there is a δ>0 such that for all atomless F1,F 2 satisfying Fi(δ) ≥ 1−δ and
every equilibrium m∗ of G, IG has an essentially strict equilibrium whose induced
distribution on the joint pure strategies in G is within ε of m∗.
13For the deﬁnition of “regular equilibrium,” see e.g., van Damme (1991, Chapter 2.5, Deﬁn-
ition 2.5.1, p. 39).
20Remark. A c c o r d i n gt ot h i st h e o r e m ,f o ra n ys u ﬃciently nearby game IG, every
equilibrium of G can be approximated by some equilibrium distribution of IG. A
standard upper hemicontinuity argument establishes the converse, namely that all
equilibrium distributions of nearby games IG must be close to some equilibrium
of G.
The proof is given in Appendix B. The idea is to exploit the fact that player
i’s behavior in IG depends only upon the distribution mj in Mj induced by j’s
strategy in IG. Moreover, because by A.2 the vi(mik) are distinct, all but ﬁnitely
many types of player i have a unique best reply against any such distribution mj
and this best reply is one of the mik. Letting gi(mj) denote the Fi-average over
i’s best replies as his type varies, it is not diﬃcult to show that gi is continuous.
Moreover, if the mass of Fi is suﬃciently concentrated near 0, then gi(mj) is
very close to a best reply in G against mj. Consequently, g = g1 × g2 is close to
the product of the players’ best reply correspondences for G. Because any regular
equilibrium of G is an “essential” ﬁxed point of G’s best-reply correspondence and
g is continuous, powerful results from algebraic topology allow us to conclude that
g must have a ﬁxed point near any such equilibrium of G. But, by construction,
ﬁxed points of g are the distributions on M of equilibria of IG. The desired
conclusion follows.
The theorem establishes that our incomplete information perturbation, IG,
can rationalize any equilibrium of a generic game G through a nearby equilib-
rium of IG in which the players have strict incentives to play their part. While
this result is reminiscent of Harsanyi (1973), we have already seen that such an
equilibrium of IG sometimes involves a positive measure of a player’s types using
non-degenerate mixed strategies.
5.3. The Interpretation
Let m∗ be an equilibrium of a two-person game G that satisﬁes A.1 and A.2.
Suppose that IG
n converges to G, 14 that σn is an equilibrium of IG
n for every
n, and that the induced distributions, ¯ σn, converge to m∗. By 5.1, almost every
type of player i strictly optimizes in σn by employing one of the mixed strategies
{mi1,...,miKi}, so that σn
i entails some fraction of i’s types, µn
ik, say, employing
mik for each k. Hence, the other player is certain that player i will employ one
of the mik, but is uncertain about which of the mik player i will employ. His
conjecture, or belief, is that player i will employ mik with probability µn
ik. Finally,
14That is, the cdf’s Fn
i of IG
n converge to mass points at zero as n →∞ .










ik is the limiting fraction of i’s types employing mik.15 This decomposition
of m∗
i therefore leads us to the following interpretation.
Each player i’s equilibrium mixture, m∗
i, can be expressed as a convex combination
of the mixed strategies {mi1,...,miKi}. Each mixed strategy given positive weight
in the convex combination represents a strategy that i might deliberately employ,
while the weight on that mixed strategy represents the opponent’s belief that i will
employ it.
We have already seen that strictly mixed equilibria in zero-sum games have
degenerate decompositions in which all of the weight is placed on the equilibrium
mixed strategy. Consequently, such equilibria can always be interpreted from the
purely classical point of view where the players deliberately randomize because
concealment is beneﬁcial.
Under what conditions is concealment beneﬁcial in the nonzero-sum case?
Equivalently, when does the above decomposition place positive weight on at least
one non-degenerate mixed strategy? In such cases our interpretation of a mixed
equilibrium will involve the classical view. Alternatively, under what conditions
will the players instead wish to reveal their pure choices? Equivalently, when does
the above decomposition give positive weight only to pure strategies. In such
cases, our interpretation is similar to the Bayesian view. (See, for example, The
Battle of the Sexes, in Section 2). These questions are taken up next.
6. When To Conceal, When To Reveal
In IG, when a player of a given type strictly prefers to employ a non-degenerate
mixed strategy from G, it is because that type strictly prefers concealing the
pure choices in the support of that mixed strategy. When this occurs and the
equilibrium of IG is near an equilibrium of G, our interpretation of G’s equilib-
rium will involve (perhaps only partially) the classical view that randomization is
deliberate. This motivates the following deﬁnition.
15Assume without loss that µn
ik → µ∗
ik.
22Deﬁnition 6.1. An equilibrium m of G is strongly concealing for player i if there
exists η>0 such that for all suﬃciently small ε>0 and all atomless distributions
F1,F 2 satisfying Fi(ε) ≥ 1 − ε, every equilibrium of IG ≡(U1,U 2;M1,M 2,F 1,F 2)
whose distribution on X1 × X2 is within ε of m has the property that the Fi-
measure of player i’s types employing non-degenerate mixed strategies from G is
at least η.16
Thus, an equilibrium m of G is strongly concealing if for all nearby atomless
incomplete information games IG, a positive fraction of types must strictly mix
in all equilibria near m.17
Theorem 4.1 implies that a mixed equilibrium of a zero-sum game is strongly
concealing for i if and only if i has no pure maxmin strategy. Consequently, the
ﬁfty-ﬁfty equilibrium of Matching Pennies is strongly concealing for both players.
As we shall see, the unique mixed equilibrium of the nonzero-sum game Modi-
ﬁed Rock-Scissors-Paper from Section 2 is also strongly concealing for both players
because, like the Matching Pennies’ equilibrium, its support contains a “cyclic best
reply sequence.”
Formally, a best reply sequence in G is a ﬁnite sequence x1,x 2,...,xn of joint
pure strategies such that in each step, say from xk to xk+1, one player’s strategy is
unchanged and the other player’s strategy in xk+1 is a best reply to the opponent’s
strategy in xk. A best reply sequence is cyclic if at least two of its elements are
distinct and the ﬁrst and last are identical.
The proofs of the following results can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that m∗ is an equilibrium of G. If the support of m∗
contains a cyclic best reply sequence along which best replies are unique, then m∗
is strongly concealing for both players.
For generic games, players have unique best replies against pure strategies and
so along best reply sequences. This leads to the following corollary.
16Reny and Robson (2002) also deﬁne an equilibrium to be merely concealing if these con-
ditions hold for some, as opposed to all, atomless distributions Fi. They point out that some
games possess equilibria that are concealing but not strongly concealing. We shall not discuss
this weaker concept here.
17Theorem 5.2 ensures that under A.1 and A.2 no m can be strongly concealing simply because
the particular Fi admit no equilibria of IG near m.
23Corollary 6.3. Generically, if a completely mixed equilibrium is not strongly
concealing for either player, then beginning from any joint pure strategy, alter-
nately best replying to one another eventually leads the players to a pure strategy
equilibrium.
Theorem 6.2 is driven in part by the fact that when best replies are unique,
a best reply sequence can cycle only if, somewhere along it, some player’s payoﬀ
strictly falls when the other player switches to a best reply.
On the other hand, suppose that player i’s payoﬀ falls nowhere along any best
reply sequence. This means that beginning from any joint pure strategy, player i
is, generically, made better oﬀ when player j switches to a best reply against i’s
strategy. Simply put, player i beneﬁts when j ﬁnds out i’s pure strategy choice. In
such cases one would expect that concealment is harmful, i.e. that player i would
prefer to reveal his choice. Our ﬁnal result shows that this is indeed the case.
Note that this result applies, in particular, to The Battle of the Sexes as well as to
a whole class of coordination games. In all such games then, our interpretation of
their equilibria involves only the Bayesian view. No player deliberately randomizes
because randomization is actually harmful.
Theorem 6.4. Suppose G satisﬁes genericity assumption A.2. If player i’s payoﬀ
is weakly increasing along every best reply sequence in G,t h e ni ne v e r ye q u i l i b r i u m
of IG, all but perhaps ﬁnitely many types of player i strictly optimize by employing
a pure strategy. In particular then, no equilibrium of G is strongly concealing for
i.
7. The Signiﬁcance of Unused Strategies
We now demonstrate that whether an equilibrium is strongly concealing or not
can depend on the payoﬀs to unused strategies. The reason for this is that unused
strategies may be best replies when the opponent’s mixed strategy is found out.
Consider, for example, the game of Figure 7.1. The 2×2 matrix in the top-
left corner is Matching Pennies and the ﬁfty-ﬁfty Matching Pennies equilibrium
remains a regular equilibrium of this game. However, although the ﬁfty-ﬁfty
mixture is strongly concealing in Matching Pennies, without the strategies U and
D, it is not strongly concealing here, when they are present.
T h er e a s o nt h a tt h eﬁfty-ﬁfty equilibrium is not strongly concealing here is
that each player knows that if he uses the pure strategy H or T and his opponent
24HT































Figure 7.1: The Role of Unused Strategies
ﬁnds this out, the opponent will choose either U or D, giving the player his highest
possible payoﬀ of 2. Indeed, any nondegenerate mixture over H and T is strictly
worse for a player than one of the pure strategies H or T.
To see this, consult Figure 7.2, where the solid line is player 1’s payoﬀ when
player 2 ﬁnds out that 1 employs the mixed strategy: H with probability p and
T with probability 1 − p. ( T h el a b e l sH ,T ,Ua n dDr e f e rt op l a y e r2 ’ sb e s t
reply.) The dotted line gives 1’s payoﬀ, conditional on being found out, from the
lottery in which the pure strategies H and T are chosen with probability p and
1 − p, respectively. Player 1’s payoﬀ from any such lottery is constant and equal
to 2. Since every nondegenerate mixture gives a payoﬀ strictly less than 2, and
the lottery and the mixture are equivalent if player 1 is not found out, the lottery
is strictly better than the mixture for any positive type of player 1. Hence, no
positive type will employ any such mixture, and the ﬁfty-ﬁfty equilibrium is not
strongly concealing.
Another way to see that the ﬁfty-ﬁfty equilibrium is not strongly concealing is
to note that both players’ payoﬀs in Figure 7.1 are strictly increasing along every
best reply sequence. Because A.2 holds generically, we can perturb the game










Figure 7.2: Player 1’s payoﬀ when observed by player 2
8. IG as the Reduced Form of a Dynamic Game
Finally, we address a key issue with a static model. This issue was described by
von Neumann and Morgenstern as follows (VNM, 17.3, pp.146-8):
On the one hand we have always insisted that our theory is a static
one and that we analyze the course of one play and not that of a
sequence of successive plays. But on the other hand we have placed
considerations concerning the danger of one’s strategy being found
out into an absolutely central position. How can the strategy of a
player–particularly one who plays a random mixture of several diﬀer-
ent strategies–be found out if not by repeated observation!
Although von Neumann and Morgenstern went on to argue that a dynamic model
was nevertheless unnecessary, their argument is not entirely convincing. It is
therefore worth pointing out that the static game IG from Section 3 is consistent
with a fully dynamic interpretation in which no player’s mixed strategy choice
is ever directly revealed to the opponent. Rather, each player’s mixed strategy
choice is deduced by an opponent only after many observations of the realizations
26of the player’s mixed strategy. We now sketch a simple dynamic model leading to
this interpretation of IG.
Suppose that the two-person nonzero-sum game, G, is repeatedly played by
randomly matching, in each period, players from two large populations, so that
there is no possibility of two particular players meeting more than once. Within
each population there are two “varieties” of players. Variety I players, the focus
of attention, do not observe the history of an opponent and must pay a small
positive cost to implement any strategy that is other than zero-recall. Variety
II players are not subject to such a cost and observe their opponent’s history
(i.e., the opponent’s past pure actions) before play. Each player’s type is ﬁxed
once and for all, and a player’s type is the probability that he is matched with
a variety II opponent in any given period. Hence, sending the type distributions
to mass points at zero is equivalent to sending the fraction of variety II players
in each population to zero. When there are no variety II players, the dynamic
game is simply an inﬁnite repetition of G between players who meet at most once
and observe only their own histories. Both variety I and variety II players have
expected liminf of the mean payoﬀs.
It can be shown that, if the fraction of variety II players in each population
is close enough to zero, then for any equilibrium, (σ1,σ2), of the static game IG,
there is an equilibrium of the dynamic game in which a variety I player of type ti
employs σi(·|ti) in each period, regardless of the history. Further, it can be shown
that almost every type of variety I player strictly prefers this zero-recall strategy
to any other strategy available in the dynamic game, whether ﬁnite-recall or not.18
Hence the static game IG has the following dynamic interpretation. A player’s
type, ti, is not the probability that the opponent ﬁnds out his mixed strategy.
Rather, it is the probability that the opponent observes the realizations of his
mixed strategy choices in all previous periods. Thus, a player’s mixed strategy
is deduced by an opponent through repeated observations of the player’s past
actions. The reduced form model, IG, is a parsimonious representation of this.
18The presence of a complexity cost is for simplicity. Similar conclusions can be shown to
hold without such a complexity cost (see Reny and Robson (2002)).
27Appendices
A. Compatibility of Beliefs
The game IG can be interpreted as part of the following extensive form game,
w h e r et h ep l a y e r sk n o wt h a tt h e yw i l lb ep l a y i n gG, but do not necessarily know
whether their mixed strategy choices are made simultaneously.
• Nature begins by choosing each ti,i=1 ,2, independently according to Hi
on [0,1].
• Each player i is privately informed of ti and Nature then determines whether
the game is simultaneous according to the following event partition.
• With probability (1 − t1)(1 − t2) neither player receives any additional in-
formation before simultaneously choosing a mixed strategy.
• With probability ti(1−tj) player i receives no additional information but in
fact makes his mixed strategy choice in Mi ﬁrst, before player j, who is then
informed of i’s mixed strategy choice prior to choosing a mixed strategy in
Mj.
• With probability t1t2 it is common knowledge that the two players choose
their mixed strategies simultaneously.
• After the players choose their mixed strategies, G is played with those strate-
gies and the game ends.
Note ﬁrst that in the extensive form, each player knows he may ﬁnd out
the other player’s mixed strategy. Of course, in these subgames, he simply best
replies to the revealed mixed strategy of the opponent. Second, note that when it
is common knowledge that the players choose their strategies simultaneously, the
resulting game is simply G, and so any equilibrium of G can be speciﬁed in this
event.
Thus the remaining decision faced by a player i in the above extensive form
occurs when he receives no additional information prior to making his mixed
strategy choice. In this case, player i assigns probability ti to the event that the
opponent ﬁnds out his strategy, just as in IG.
28Further, when i r e c e i v e sn oa d d i t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o n ,h em u s tu p d a t eh i sb e l i e f s
concerning j’s type. According to Bayes’ rule, i’s updated beliefs about j’s type
are given by the distribution
Fj(tj)=
R tj
0 (1 − t)dHj(t)
R 1
0 (1 − t)dHj(t)
.
These distributions provide the F1 and F2 given in the deﬁnition of IG and can
be shown to yield the appropriate expected payoﬀs. In particular, the posterior
for the opponent’s type is independent of own type.
Thus, IG is the part of this extensive form game in which each player has
not found out the opponent’s mixed strategy but believes it is possible that the
opponent will ﬁnd out his.
B. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1. T h e“ i f ”p a r to ft h eﬁrst statement is straightforward.
Hence, we proceed with the “only if” part.
Even though G is a zero-sum game, IG will typically not be. However, IG is
best reply equivalent to the zero-sum game of incomplete information, IG
0, that








The two games of incomplete information therefore have the same sets of equi-
libria. Throughout the remainder of the proof, the term “maxmin strategy” will
refer to a maxmin strategy in the zero sum game G (not the zero-sum game IG
0).
IG
0 clearly has an equilibrium in which every type of each player chooses a
maxmin strategy, giving IG
0 a value of v0, say.20 Moreover, because beginning
from such an equilibrium player 1’s payoﬀ rises above v0 when a positive measure
of player 2’s types choose a non-maxmin strategy (owing to the term −v2(m2)
appearing in 1’s payoﬀ and because F2(0) = 0), every equilibrium must involve
19This particularly simple argument requires each
R t
1−tdFi(t) to be ﬁnite. A similar proof,
which involves a separate argument for types near unity, delivers the result even when one or
both integrals are inﬁnite.





29almost every type of player 2 employing, with probability one, a maxmin strategy.
A similar argument applies to player 1. This proves of the “only if” part.
So, in IG,F j-a.e. type of player j employs one of his maxmin strategies.
Consequently, player i can obtain at most his value whether or not he is found
out and so is indiﬀerent among all of his maxmin strategies. Furthermore, by
employing a non maxmin strategy player i’s payoﬀ cannot be above his value if he
is not found out and his payoﬀ will be strictly below his value if he is found out.
Therefore, every positive type strictly prefers every maxmin strategy to every non
maxmin strategy.
P r o o fo fG e n e r i c i t yo fA . 2 .We wish to show that for ﬁxed ﬁnite sets of pure
strategies X1 and X2, and for all but a closed and Lebesgue measure zero set of
pairs of the players’ payoﬀ matrices, for each i =1 ,2 the values vi(mi1),...,vi(miKi)
are distinct.
Let ni = |Xi| and let U2 denote the set of n1 × n2 payoﬀ matrices for player 2
in which every submatrix with at least two entries: (i) has full rank after adding
a single row of 1’s, and (ii) if square, is non singular.
The set of n1×n2 payoﬀ matrices U1 for player 1 is deﬁned analogously except
that “row” is replaced by “column” in (i) above. The usage of “row” and “column”
in the following paragraph assumes that i =1and j =2 . In the analogous
alternative case, interchange “row” and “column” throughout the paragraph.
Viewing Uj as a subset of Rn1n2, Uj is open and its complement has Lebesgue
measure zero. For any payoﬀ matrix uj ∈ Uj, we may construct for each xj in Xj
the convex polyhedral set Ci(xj) ⊆ Mi–which we now write Ci(xj;uj) to make
explicit the dependence upon uj. Let Ei(uj) be the ﬁnite union over xj ∈ Xj of
the ﬁnite sets of extreme points of Ci(xj;uj). An implication of conditions (i) and
(ii) in the deﬁnition of Uj is: (∗) if a sequence un
j ∈ Uj converges to u0
j ∈ Uj, and
for every n, mn
i1 and mn
i2 a r ed i s t i n c te l e m e n t so fEi(un





i2 are distinct elements of Ei(u0
j). To see this we shall
ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tf o re v e r yuj ∈ Uj,m i ∈ Ei(uj) if and only if the submatrix of uj
whose rows are determined by i’s pure strategies in the support of mi and whose
columns are determined by j’s pure uj-best replies against mi, is square.21 So,
suppose ﬁr s tt h a tf o rs o m exj ∈ Xj,m i is extreme in Ci(xj;uj). If the submatrix
has fewer rows than columns, then because mi makes j indiﬀerent between the
columns, the submatrix will not have full rank after the addition of a row of 1’s,
in violation of (i). But if there are fewer columns than rows, then in addition
21See also Shapley (1974, Assumption 2.2).
30to mi, there are many linear combinations of the rows, with weights summing to
unity, that are proportional to a row of 1’s. If z(xi) denotes the weight on each
row xi in one such solution, z, distinct from mi, then for |α| > 0 small enough
(1−α)mi +αz is in Ci(xj;uj) contradicting the fact that mi is extreme.22 Hence,
the submatrix must be square. Conversely, suppose the submatrix is square.
Choose any xj ∈ Xj that is uj-best against mi. Consequently, mi is in Ci(xj;uj)
and we shall show that mi is actually extreme in Ci(xj;uj). This is obviously the
case if the submatrix is 1×1 ,s os u p p o s et h a ti ti s2 ×2 or larger and that mi is
a strict convex combination of distinct elements, m0
i, in Ci(xj;uj). Each x0
j that
is uj-best against mi must also be best against each of the m0
i, otherwise such an
x0
j would not be as good as xj against mi. But by (ii) the non singularity of the
submatrix implies that, among strategies in Mi–like the m0
i–whose supports are
contained in mi’s, mi is the only one against which each such x0
j is best for j. Thus
each m0
i = mi and we conclude that mi is extreme in Ci(xj;uj). Returning to (∗),
let us show that m0
ik ∈ Ei(u0
j),k=1 ,2. For each k =1 ,2, assume without loss
that the rows and columns of the submatrix determined by mn
ik and un
j are ﬁxed.
By the above characterization of the extreme points this submatrix is square and
it suﬃces to show that the submatrix determined by m0
ik and u0
j is square. But the
set of rows of the latter submatrix is a subset of those along the sequence because
mn
ik → m0
ik, while its set of columns is a superset of those along the sequence
because limits of j’s best replies remain best replies at the limit. Consequently,
t h el i m i tm a t r i xh a sa tl e a s ta sm a n yc o l u m n sa sr o w s .B u ti tc a n n o th a v es t r i c t l y
fewer rows, and so must be square, because m0
ik makes j indiﬀerent between the
columns, and the submatrix would then not have full rank after the addition of
a row of 1’s, contradicting (i). It remains to show that m0
i1 and m0
i2 are distinct.
We have just seen that, for k =1and 2, t h er o w sa n dc o l u m n sd e t e r m i n e db y
mn
ik and un
j are the same as those determined by m0
ik and u0
j.T h u si ts u ﬃces to
show that the rows and columns determined by mn
i1 and un
j are not identical to
those determined by mn
i2 and un
j. But this follows immediately from the fact that
if they were identical, then the common submatrix they determine is 1x1 or non




For each of player j’s payoﬀ matrices uj ∈ Uj deﬁne a set of player i’s matrices
Ui(uj)={ui ∈ Rn1n2 :
P
xi∈Xi mi1(xi)ui(xi,x j1) 6=
P
xi∈Xi mi2(xi)ui(xi,x j2), for
22Because (1 − α)mi + αz makes j indiﬀerent between the columns, continuity implies that
the columns, and so xj in particular, are best replies to (1−α)mi+αz for |α| > 0 small enough.
Hence, (1 − α)mi + αz ∈ Ci(xj;uj).
31all xj1,x j2 ∈ Xj and all mi1 6= mi2 s.t. mik is extreme in Ci(xjk;uj) for k =1 ,2}.
Because Xj is ﬁnite and each Ci(xj;uj) has ﬁnitely many extreme points, Ui(uj)
is an open subset of Rn1n2 whose complement has Lebesgue measure zero.
Let U(i)={(u1,u 2) ∈ R2n1n2 : uj ∈ Uj and ui ∈ Ui(uj)}. Note that if
(u1,u 2) ∈ U(1) ∩ U(2) then for i =1and 2,v i(mik) 6= vi(mik0) for all distinct
mik,m ik0 in Ei(uj), as desired. It therefore suﬃces to show that each U(i) is open





2) ∈ U(i). Because Uj is open, un
j is eventually in Uj, and (∗)
implies that un
i is eventually in Ui(un
j). Hence, (un
1,u n
2) is eventually in U(i). To
see that the complement of U(i) has Lebesgue measure zero in R2n1n2,n o t et h a t
for every uj ∈ Uj, the complement of the section Ui(uj) has Lebesgue measure
zero in Rn1n2. Applying Fubini’s theorem gives the desired result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1 . The proof relies on two facts. First, for every
mi ∈ Mi, there is a lottery µi on {mi1,...,miKi} that is at least as good for i as
mi regardless of i’s type and regardless of j’s strategy. To see this, choose xj so
that mi ∈ Ci(xj) and vi(mi)=ui(mi,x j). Clearly, such an xj exists. Because
mi ∈ Ci(xj),m i is a convex combination of the extreme points of Ci(xj). We
may view the weights in this convex combination as deﬁning a lottery, µi, on
{mi1,...,miKi}. Hence, we obtain, for every ti ∈ Ti and every strategy σj for
player j in IG,








µik [(1 − ti)ui(mik, ¯ σj)+tivi(mik)],
as desired, where the inequality follows because µik is positive only when xj is
uj-best for j against mik and because, by deﬁnition, vi(mik) ≥ ui(mik,x j) for all
such xj. Note that a consequence of the above inequality is that a player’s type
has a unique best reply against the opponent’s strategy if and only if he has a
unique best reply among {mi1,...,miKi}.
Second, for a ﬁxed mixture mi ∈ Mi and a ﬁxed distribution, ¯ σj, over Xj
induced by the opponent’s strategy in IG, player i’s payoﬀ, (1 − ti)ui(mi, ¯ σj)+
tivi(mi), is linear in his type ti. Consequently, because vi(·) takes on distinct values
for distinct extreme points mik, at most one type can be indiﬀerent between any
two of the extreme points.
32Together, the two facts imply that at most ﬁnitely many types can have mul-
tiple best replies among all the extreme points and hence also among all the mi
in Mi. The result then follows because Fi is atomless.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 relies on an intuitive corollary of powerful results
from algebraic topology.
Corollary B.1. Suppose U is a bounded, open set in Rk and f, g : cl(U) → Rk
are continuous.23 Further, suppose that f is continuously diﬀerentiable on U, that
x0 is the only ﬁxed point of f in U, and that |I − Df(x0)| 6=0 . If, for every
t ∈ [0,1], the function (1−t)f +tg has no ﬁxed point on the boundary of U, then
g has a ﬁxed point in U.
Proof of Corollary B.1. Since x0 is the unique ﬁxed point of f in U, and |I − Df(x0)|
6=0 , it follows that 0 is a regular value of c(x)=x−f(x). Hence, by Dold (1972,
IV-5.13.4, p. 71), deg0 c = sgn|I − Df(x0)| = ±1. If d(x)=x − g(x), then by
hypothesis, for every t ∈ [0,1], (1−t)c+td has no zero on the boundary of U. Conse-
quently, by Dold (1972, IV-5.13.3, p. 71 and IV-5.4, p. 67), deg0 d =d e g 0 c = ±1
and d has a zero in U. Hence, g has a ﬁxed point in U.
Loosely, Corollary B.1 states that if x0 is the only ﬁxed point of f in some
neighborhood, and f is not tangent to the forty-ﬁve-degree line, then continuous
shifts of f will also have a ﬁxed point in the neighborhood, so long as no ﬁxed
point escapes through the neighborhood’s boundary.
Proof of Theorem 5.2.24 Because, by A.1, every equilibrium of G is regular,
G has ﬁnitely many isolated equilibria. Consequently, it suﬃces to establish the
result for a single equilibrium, m∗, of G. Let ni = |Xi|, and for every mi ∈ Mi,
extend ui(mi,·) linearly to all of Rnj. Because, by A.2, the vi(mik) are distinct
for each player i, for every zj ∈ Rnj there is a unique solution, bi(zj|ti) ∈ Mi, to
maxmi∈Mi(1 − ti)ui(mi,z j)+tivi(mi) for all but perhaps ﬁnitely many ti ∈ [0,1].
Moreover, by the argument given in the proof of Proposition 5.1, the unique
maximizer must be one of the mik.D e ﬁne gi(zj)=
R 1
0 bi(zj|ti)dFi(ti). Because
Fi is atomless and suﬃciently small changes in zj do not aﬀect the unique best
reply of an arbitrarily large fraction of i’s types, gi : Rnj → Mi is continuous.
Also, note that if ˆ m is a ﬁxed point of g = g1 × g2 : Rn1+n2 → M, then ˆ m ∈ M
23cl(U) denotes the closure of U.
24W eo w eas u b s t a n t i a ld e b tt oH a r iG o v i n d a nw h og r e a t l ys i m p l i ﬁed our original proof by
providing detailed suggestions upon which the following proof is based.
33and for each player i, ˆ mi =
R 1
0 bi(ˆ mj|ti)dFi(ti), so that (b1(ˆ m2|·),b 2(ˆ m1|·)) is an
equilibrium of IG whose induced distribution on M is ˆ m. Thus, given ε>0, it
suﬃces to show that for all δ small enough, g has a ﬁxed point within ε of m∗
whenever Fi(δ) ≥ 1−δ for i =1 ,2. Henceforth we shall write gδ to make explicit
the dependence of g upon δ.
Because m∗ is regular and there are just two players, the number of pure
strategies in the support of each player’s mixed strategy is the same, l say. So, as-
sume, without loss, that the support of m∗
i is {xi1,...,xil}.D e ﬁne the continuously
diﬀerentiable function fi : Rn1+n2 → Rni by
fi(z1,z 2)=zi +
⎛





zi2(ui(xi2,z j) − ui(xi1,z j))
.
.
zini(ui(xini,z j) − ui(xi1,z j))
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
. (B.1)
Let U be an open ball in Rn1+n2 containing m∗such that (i) every z ∈ U is
within ε of m∗ and m∗ is the only equilibrium of G in cl(U), (ii) z ∈ cl(U) implies
zik > 0 for every k ≤ l and i =1 ,2, (iii) z ∈ cl(U) implies ui(xik,z j)−ui(xi1,z j) <
0 for every k>land i =1 ,2. Property (i) can be satisﬁed because, by regularity,
m∗ is isolated. Property (ii) can be satisﬁed because mik > 0 for every k ≤ l,
and property (iii) can be satisﬁed because xi1 is in the support of m∗
i and, by
regularity, m∗ is quasi-strict.
Remark 1. Letting f = f1 × f2, we see that if ˆ z ∈ cl(U) is a ﬁxed point of f,
then ˆ zik(ui(xik, ˆ zj)−ui(xi1, ˆ zj)) = 0 for every k>1, so that by property (ii) of U,
ui(xik, ˆ zj) − ui(xi1, ˆ zj)=0for every k ≤ l, and by property (iii) of U, ˆ zik =0for
every k>l .Also, ˆ z ﬁxed implies 1−
P
k ˆ zik =0so that, by property (ii) of U and
ˆ zik =0all k>l ,ˆ z ∈ M. Consequently, ˆ z is an equilibrium of G, which means,
by property (i) of U, that ˆ z = m∗. Hence, m∗, a ﬁxed point of f in U, is the only
ﬁxed point of f in cl(U).
Remark 2. Because m∗ is regular, |I − Df(m∗)| 6=0 ,b yd e ﬁnition. (See van
Damme (1991, p.39).)
Let ∂U denote the boundary of U. We claim that there exists ¯ δ>0 small
enough such that:
∀δ<¯ δ and ∀t ∈ [0,1], (1 − t)f + tg
δ has no ﬁxed point in ∂U. (B.2)
34Suppose not. Then, because ∂U is compact, there exists zδ → ˆ z, tδ → ˆ t, and
gδ(zδ) → ˆ m ∈ M as δ → 0 such that for every δ, (1−tδ)f(zδ)+tδgδ(zδ)=zδ ∈ ∂U.
Consequently,
(1 − ˆ t)f(ˆ z)+ˆ tˆ m =ˆ z ∈ ∂U. (B.3)
Furthermore, ˆ t>0 because otherwise ˆ z would be a ﬁxed point of f, implying, by
Remark 1, that m∗ =ˆ z ∈ ∂U, a contradiction.
Because, for every δ>0,g δ
i(zδ
j) is the Fi-average over ti of maximizers of (1−
ti)ui(mi,zδ
j)+tivi(mi), and Fi(δ) ≥ 1−δ, ˆ mi is a maximizer of (1−ti)ui(mi, ˆ zj)+
tivi(mi) when ti =0 .H e n c e ,
ˆ mi solves max
mi∈Mi
ui(mi, ˆ zj). (B.4)
So, because, by property (iii) of U, ui(xik, ˆ zj) − ui(xi1, ˆ zj) < 0 for every k>l ,we
must have ˆ mik =0for all k>l .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,( B . 3 ) ,( B . 1 ) ,a n dˆ t>0 together
imply ˆ zik =0for all k>l .
We’ll now show that fik(ˆ z)=ˆ zik, for every 1 <k≤ l. If fik(ˆ z) < ˆ zik for some
1 <k≤ l, then property (ii) of U and (B.1) imply ui(xik, ˆ zj) − ui(xi1, ˆ zj) < 0
and so by (B.4) ˆ mik =0< ˆ zik. But this contradicts (B.3). Consequently, for
every 1 <k≤ l, fik(ˆ z) ≥ ˆ zik and so by (B.3), and because ˆ t>0, ˆ mik ≤ ˆ zik.
On the other hand, if fik(ˆ z) > ˆ zik for some 1 <k≤ l, then property (ii) of
U and (B.1) imply ui(xik, ˆ zj) − ui(xi1, ˆ zj) > 0 and so ˆ mi1 =0 . By (B.3), this
implies (1 − ˆ t)(1 −
P
k ˆ zik)+ˆ t(−ˆ zi1)=0 , and because ˆ zi1 > 0 by property (ii)
of U, we must then have 0 < ˆ t<1 and 1 −
P
k ˆ zik > 0. But this contradicts
1=
P
k ˆ mik =
P
1<k≤l ˆ mik ≤
P
1<k≤l ˆ zik <
P
k≤l ˆ zik =
P
k ˆ zik. Hence, fik(ˆ z)=ˆ zik
for every 1 <k≤ l, so that by (B.3) and the result of the previous paragraph,
ˆ mik =ˆ zik for all k>1.
Finally, (B.3) implies (1 − ˆ t)(1 −
P
k ˆ zik)+ˆ t(ˆ mi1 − ˆ zi1)=0 . But because
ˆ mik =ˆ zik for all k>1 and
P
k ˆ mik =1 , we have 1 −
P
k ˆ zik =ˆ mi1 − ˆ zi1. Hence,
ˆ mi1 =ˆ zi1 and we may conclude that ˆ z =ˆ m. However, this implies, by (B.3), that
ˆ z ∈ ∂U is a ﬁxed point of f, contradicting Remark 1, and completing the proof
of (B.2).
By (B.2) and Remarks 1 and 2, we may appeal to Corollary B.1 and conclude
that for all δ<¯ δ, gδ : Rn1+n2 → M has a ﬁxed point in U.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Consider the point (x0
i,x j) on the cyclic best reply
sequence that maximizes i’s payoﬀ when j’s pure strategy is a best reply against
i’s. Consider also the next two points along the sequence, (xi,x j) and (xi,x 0
j).
35Because the sequence is a cycle and best replies are unique along it, xi 6= x0
i and
x0
j 6= xj. Because the cycle is contained in the support of m∗,m ∗




Now, by construction, ui(x0
i,x j) ≥ ui(xi,x 0
j). Also, because best replies are
unique along the sequence, ui(x0
i,x j) <u i(xi,x j) and we may choose γ>0 small




i probability (1 − γ) and xi probability γ. Consequently,
vi(m
γ











i,x j) and vi(xi)=ui(xi,x 0
j) then imply that vi(m
γ




i is strictly better for i than each of the pure strategies xi
and x0
i when i’s strategy is found out.
Suppose σ is an equilibrium of IG. Given the equilibrium strategy σj of
player j and the distribution, ¯ σj ∈ Mj it induces, suppose without loss that
min(ui(x0
i, ¯ σj),u i(xi, ¯ σj)) = ui(x0
i, ¯ σj). Then ui(m
γ
i , ¯ σj)=( 1 −γ)ui(x0
i, ¯ σj)+γui(xi, ¯ σj)
≥ ui(x0
i, ¯ σj). Consequently, m
γ
i is at least as good as x0
i when i’s strategy is not
found out. Altogether, this means that m
γ
i is strictly better than x0
i for every
positive type of player i against σj.
Consequently, if the distribution ¯ σi is close enough to m∗
i, then because the
fraction of types employing x0
i is zero and m∗
i(x0
i) > 0, a positive and bounded
away from zero measure of types must employ non-degenerate mixed strategies.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Suppose that σ is an equilibrium of IG. As can be seen
from the proof of Proposition 5.1, A.2 implies that i’s best reply to σj,σ i(ti), is
unique for all but perhaps ﬁnitely many ti. It therefore suﬃces to show that when
ti’s best reply is unique, it is pure.
So, let mi be ti’s unique best reply against σj. . Suppose that, upon ﬁnding
out mi, a best reply for player j w h i c hb r e a k st i e si ni’s favor is xj.C o n s i d e r
the lottery, µi, in ∆(Mi) giving probability mi(xi) to each pure strategy xi. If j
does not ﬁnd out i’s strategy choice, this lottery yields player i t h es a m ep a y o ﬀ
as the mixed strategy mi. If j ﬁnds out i’s strategy choice, the lottery yields i
an expected payoﬀ of
P
xi∈Xi mi(xi)vi(xi), because j ﬁnds out the outcome of the
lottery. This payoﬀ must be at least as large as vi(mi)=
P
xi∈Xi mi(xi)ui(xi,x j),
36since if player j has a best reply to xi that diﬀers from xj, switching to it cannot
hurt player i, by hypothesis. Hence,




mi(xi)[(1 − ti)ui(xi, ¯ σj)+tivi(xi)],
which says that, against σj, ti’s payoﬀ from employing his unique best reply mi
is no higher than his payoﬀ from employing the lottery µi. Hence, one of the pure
strategies in the support of the lottery must be a best reply against σj, which, by
uniqueness, implies that mi must be this pure strategy.
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